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SYSTEMS NEUROSCIENCE
Rapid eye movement and dreaming could be a self-start mode 
to re-construct and sustain consciousness after that capability 
has been wiped out in Stage N3. Stage N3 is so deep it even 
shuts down basic breathing reflexes in people with sleep apnea. 
Without REM and in the absence of external stimulus, the brain 
might stay in Stage N3 coma continuously until starvation and 
dehydration cause death. You could say, REM is the brain’s way 
of “booting up” its consciousness in the absence of an “external 
trigger.”
From the Stage N3 pit, the whole neural representation of 
conscious self has to be reconstructed from procedural memory, 
and the brain has to re-start the process from a zero baseline. 
The aborted REM episodes early in a night’s sleep may reflect 
early attempts to help the brain recover the capacity for creating 
consciousness. These attempts may have to reach a certain set-
point threshold, and may even be probabilistic, involving trial and 
error. Sustained awakening might require a series of REM episodes 
throughout the night.
The inherent speculation in any hypothesis needs to meet four 
criteria. The hypothesis must,
(1) have evidence to suggest it
(2) yield predictive and explanatory power
(3) compare favorably with competing theories
(4) be testable
Herein is presented the notion that rapid eye movement (REM) 
sleep is a sleeping brain’s attempt to recover consciousness from the 
disruption of deep sleep. The rationale derives from the following 
self-evident fact: awakening from deep sleep requires the brain 
to become “less sleepy” by re-organizing its circuitry toward the 
threshold for conscious wakefulness. REM may well be a mecha-
nism for moving the brain state in that direction. REM may be a 
spontaneously triggered state that occurs when the brain has had 
enough slow-wave sleep (SWS).
Rapid eye movement normally occurs only after long sequence 
of SWS stages, initially dominated by deep Stage N3 [the new equiv-
alent for the older term, Stage IV, according to the classification 
scheme of 2004 from the American Academy of Sleep Medicine 
(Iber et al., 2007)]. Hereafter, I will use N3 any time I am referring 
to the more familiar term, Stage IV. In N3 the complex neural 
network inter-relationships necessary to create and sustain wake-
fulness must surely be obliterated. REM also promotes numerous 
conscious-like dreams. Also, the last awakening from a night’s sleep 
typically occurs in a REM episode during a dream, suggesting that 
the threshold for wakefulness has been reached. These observations 
lead to the hypothesis that REM might be the brain’s way to awaken 
itself after it has had a sufficient amount of SWS.
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How this wake-up hypothesis meets these criteria is summa-
rized below.
EvidEncE
All mammals (and birds and a few reptilian species) have a 
recurrent cyclic pattern of sequential stages of SWS and REM 
(Weitzman, 1972). The cycle reflects distinct state changes with 
likely  corresponding changes in unit activity and associated field 
potentials. Certain well-established facts about this cyclic sleep 
pattern suggest that the REM stage of sleep serves to awaken a 
sleeping brain.
(1) A normal human nightly sleep is a progression of uncon-
scious sleep stages, punctuated by episodes of brain acti-
vation (REM) in which brain activity resembles that seen 
in wakefulness and dreams occur in which events seem to 
be consciously perceived (Figure 1). Early in the night, the 
human brain undergoes a state change of so-called “SWS,” so-
called because of the dominance of slow-frequency brain field 
potentials. The brain then soon plunges into what is known 
as Stage N3, a relatively long and deep abyss of sleep as far 
removed from consciousness as a normal, un-drugged brain 
can get. Obviously, whatever patterns of nerve impulses and 
network temporal–spatial activity were required to construct 
and sustain consciousness during wakefulness were oblitera-
ted upon falling asleep. The large slow electrical waves that 
permeate the neocortex during mammalian sleep presuma-
bly reflect slow synchronous activity of neurons that is pre-
venting emergence of consciousness. How does the brain get 
itself out of this abyss in the absence of external stimulation?
(2) Dreaming, a kind of awake state in which the dreamer is 
an active mental observer or agent in the dream, is a relia-
ble component of the REM state. The wake-up hypothe-
sis regards dreaming as a consequence of REM. Like the 
consciousness of wakefulness, the ability to dream in REM 
requires highly ordered and orchestrated neuronal popula-
tion activity. Though the brain is activated in REM, it lacks 
the corrective feedback from external reality of wakefulness 
and that of course could help explain why the dreaming brain 
constructs images and story lines that may often be bizarre. 
The state change progression to REM is also a progression 
toward consciousness.
(3) Slow-wave sleep and REM have apparently co-evolved, being 
most conspicuous in mammals. Suppose the brain mecha-
nisms that evolved to produce awareness in dreams are the 
same as those that evolved to produce human consciousness. 
Suppose rudiments of those same dreaming and con-
sciousness processes occur in lower mammals. Of course we 
cannot prove non-humans are conscious. But, since REM and 
dreams coincide in humans, there is the possibility that other 
mammals that also have REM may also dream and have a 
degree of consciousness. Anybody who seen dogs sleep is hard 
pressed to explain in any other way how the feet paddling, 
nose twitching, change in facial expression, and barking that 
often occur during their REM sleep occur without a cognitive 
component.
(4) Most people awaken after a normal night’s sleep in the mor-
ning at some point in a REM episode, often in the midst of a 
dream. This suggests that there is a threshold for awakening 
and consciousness and that it is REM that drives the sleeping 
brain to reach that threshold.
(5) Rapid eye movement most likely arises from some of the 
same ascending brainstem arousal influences that create and 
sustain wakefulness. In awake subjects, conscious arousal is 
enhanced by activity in the brainstem’s ascending reticular 
arousal system (ARAS). Sleeping animals are awakened by 
stimuli that activate the ARAS. Conscious experiences and 
thinking interfere with sleep, because sensory input activates 
the ARAS, which in turn activates the neocortex to produce 
wakefulness and consciousness (Figure 2).
Though there are many discrete and heterogeneous neuronal 
clusters in the reticular formation, widespread activation can be 
produced from focal, low-level electrical stimulation at most levels 
along the central reticular core. Activation responses are not limited 
to the cortex and EEG, but also include limbic system (onset of 
hippocampal theta activity) and both ascending and descending 
muscle tone (Klemm, 1972). The brainstem reticular formation 
was originally thought to be a homogeneous polysynaptic net that 
indiscriminatingly generated consciousness from sleep or enhanced 
arousal of the awake state. One could get that impression reinforced 
from the way arousal is represented in Figure 2. We now know 
(see Hobson and Brazier, 1980) that the reticular core contains 
numerous nuclear groups that have their own distinct functions, 
many of which may not be necessary or sufficient for conscious-
ness even though many of these neurons project extensively to the 
neocortex and modulate consciousness. Nonetheless, the functional 
neuroanatomy of even the defined nuclei in the brainstem reticular 
formation constitute the basic set of somato-sensing structures 
necessary for core consciousness and its core self to emerge Parvizi 
and Damasio (2001). While there is a reticular origin of fibers that 
cause diffuse cortical desynchronization, the different neurotrans-
FIguRE 1 | Schematic illustration of the sequence of stages in normal 
human sleep. For the first hour or so, the brain is plunged into a deep 
functional abyss. As the night progresses, SWS episodes (Stages 1–4) 
become shorter, and REM episodes appear and become longer, culminating 
in wakefulness in the morning. The EEG (lower half of figure) reflects these 
state changes and reveals similarity between wakefulness and REM. (From 
Buzsáki, 2006).
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Comparable identification of neuron activity in the neocortex in 
the various sleep stages is not available. But it seems possible that 
REM sleep is not simply a kind of wakefulness, but rather an inter-
mediate stage between SWS and wakefulness, once that reflects an 
attempt to “recover” from SWS. Circuit activity in REM may reflect 
an incomplete attempt to re-organize. Even so, a key commonality 
is the release of acetylcholine in the cortex. Acetylcholine release 
in the neocortex is particularly important to alert consciousness, 
and microdialysis measurements of its release reveal an increase 
of approximately 100% during both quiet waking and REM, while 
the amount released during active waking was still larger, on the 
order of 175% during active waking, compared with the amount 
released in SWS Marrosu et al. (1995).
In going to sleep, external source of arousal abates and con-
sciousness disappears. The deep Stage N3 sleep interferes most 
profoundly with the brain’s ability to generate consciousness. SWS 
sleep abolishes whatever temporal pattern of action potentials and 
their flow through circuits and networks necessary for conscious-
ness. To awaken, this impulse flow pattern must be regenerated.
Stage N3 sleep is the deepest stage of sleep and occupies almost 
half of the first hour of sleep and has a significant presence for the 
next 2 h (Webb and Agnew, 1971). Whatever the function of SWS, 
at some point the brain has had enough of it. REM may be the 
signature that enough SWS has occurred.
Do dreams play a role? Dream content, as in nightmares, might 
contribute to an arousal level sufficient for awakening, just as stimu-
lating thought during wakefulness can keep us aroused to the point 
of making it difficult to go to sleep. But more fundamental are the 
neuronal processes that create REM and in turn a level of activity 
that can produce and sustain wakefulness.
Rapid eye movement is commonly regarded to emerge from 
auto-excitatory mechanisms arising from increasing activity in cer-
tain neuron clusters in the pontine region of the reticular forma-
tion (Steriade and McCarley, 2005). The switching among waking, 
REM, and non-REM states has been attributed to certain pontine 
neurons: “REM-off” neurons which are active in waking and silent 
in REM, and “REM-on” neurons that are active during wakefulness 
and inactive in REM (reviewed by Hobson, 2009).
These neurons not only enable the signs of REM, such as REMs 
and suppression of bodily movement, but they probably also coop-
erate with adjacent reticular neurons to turn on the ARAS, cortical 
activity, and the consciousness of dreams. These pontine neurons 
increase their firing during dreaming and cease it with the transition 
to wakefulness. Thus the main difference between wakefulness and 
dreaming is that these special pontine neurons are only active dur-
ing dreaming, while most of the other reticular formation neurons 
are active in both REM and wakefulness. Certainly, the profound 
re-organizing of neuronal networks and likely dynamic instabilities 
during REM could be expected to distort dream content. In any 
case, it would seem easier for the brain to switch instantly from 
REM consciousness to wakefulness than from Stage N3 sleep to 
wakefulness.
(6) Rapid eye movement sleep shares many, but not all, of the 
properties of wakefulness and thus may be a transitional state 
between SWS and wakefulness. SWS is a functionally pertur-
bed state that eventually must be corrected so that embodied 
brain can direct adaptive behavior that can only occur in 
mitters released from brainstem nuclei into cortex have modulatory 
functions such as adjusting local patterns of synchronization and 
coherence. The classical arousal response seems to be engendered 
mainly from cholinergic neurons in the upper brainstem (Steriade, 
1993). Nonetheless, we should not infer that these nuclei function 
independently of each other, because neurons in this region are sur-
rounded by interlacing fibers, which gave the region the appearance 
of a reticulum that is a web. Cortical activation and consciousness 
are not likely to depend on one single brainstem nucleus or one 
single family of nuclei, but rather on a network formed by several 
families of nuclei Parvizi and Damasio (2001).
Though the reticular arousal system idea fell somewhat out of 
favor in the face of discoveries of reticular formation heterogeneity, 
a modern pioneer in cortical activation research, Mircea Steriade 
said that “it is encouraging that the concept of brainstem activa-
tion of the cortical processes has been rescued from oblivion and 
substantiated” (Steriade, 1996).
Recent MRI studies confirm a relatively global inactivation 
of brain during non-REM and a reactivation during REM that 
is greater in some areas than during wakefulness (Maquet et al., 
1996; Braun et al., 1997; Nofzinger et al., 1997).
Neuronal activity in brainstem and hypothalamus varies consid-
erably across the sleep–wakefulness continuum, and it is not clear 
which of these neurons have necessary and sufficient causal rela-
tions to a given state. Some brainstem neurons are only active dur-
ing REM, some brainstem and hypothalamic neurons are mostly 
active during wakefulness, while others are mostly active during 
both SWS and REM, and still others are mostly active during wake-
fulness and REM (Steridae and Hobson, 1976; Datta, 1995; McGinty 
and Szymusiak, 2003; Sakai and Crochet, 2003). This confused pic-
ture suggests significant network organizational differences along 
the sleep–wakefulness continuum and that state transitions are 
not trivial processes.
FIguRE 2 | Diagram of the traditional view of the function of the 
ascending reticular arousal system (ARAS), which provides a global 
activation of neocortex at the same time that somatic sensations are 
topographically routed via specific thalamic nuclei to the sensory cortex. 
Typically over-looked (and not illustrated here) are the feedback influences 
from neocortex to thalamus and brainstem reticulum. See comments below it 
item #6. (From Klemm, 2011).
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In a subsequent study from this lab (Cantero et al., 2004), 
gamma power exhibited greater variation across cortical regions 
during wakefulness than during either slow-wave or REM sleep. 
Additionally, gamma coherence was higher in wakefulness than 
during sleep.
EEG analysis of eyes-closed wakefulness revealed widespread 
nearest-neighbor positive synchronous interactions, similar to the 
results with magnetoencephalography, though less consistent across 
subjects. REM sleep demonstrated positive synchronous interac-
tions akin to wakefulness but weaker. SWS showed strong positive 
interactions in a large left fronto-temporal–parietal cluster mark-
edly more consistent across subjects (Langheim et al., 2011).
Coherences within the hippocampus may relate to the memory 
consolidation processes that occur during sleep. In Buzsáki’s lab 
(Montgomery et al., 2008), researchers simultaneously recorded 
from 96 implanted silicon probes in the hippocampus. Synchrony 
of the theta and gamma field potential activity and their underly-
ing impulse activity was much greater among certain parts of the 
hippocampus during REM than during regular alert wakefulness, 
while the opposite was true in other regions of the hippocampus.
These findings suggest that various stages of the sleep– wakefulness 
cycle have distinct differences in their underlying neural network 
activity. REM may be a process for combating the activity disarray 
occurring in SWS by increasing ordered unit activity and promoting 
regional (and perhaps inter-frequency) coherences.
(7) Cortico-fugal projections to brainstem arousal areas provide 
a way for increased cortical activity in REM to progressively 
raise the sleeping brain to the activity level required for wake-
fulness. Terminal degeneration studies in the brainstem after 
fronto-parietal neocortical lesions in cats revealed cortico-
fugal terminals scattered throughout both sides of the pontine 
and medullary reticular formation, especially prominent in 
the region immediately dorsal to the rostral half of the inferior 
olive Rossi and Brodal (1956). The pontine projection occurs 
in the rostral reticular zone extending dorsally to just in front 
of the abducens nerve. This projection is especially relevant 
because the control neurons for REM are found in pontine 
RF. This study also revealed cortico-fugal projections to the 
medullary reticular formation known to mediate global motor 
inhibition, which is prominent during SWS and most promi-
nent during REM except for punctuated bursts of twitching. 
Most cortico-fugal fiber terminate in reticular regions that do 
not have long ascending projections. Thus, external stimuli 
may more readily cause awakening than can cortico-fugal 
drive during REM. Nonetheless, neurons in the nucleus gigan-
tocellularis, a major brainstem component of the ARAS, do 
project rostrally and also receive dense cortico-fugal input. 
Rossi and Brodal suggested this is a path whereby neocortex 
can modulate the ARAS. Cortico-fugal input also goes to the 
nucleus of the solitary tract, a well-known SWS “center.”
Anterograde and retrograde degeneration methods used in 
monkeys yielded further support for the idea that neocortex can 
modulate the ARAS Kuypers and Lawrence (1967). Parietal pre- 
and post-central neocortex project to the dorsolateral midbrain 
reticular formation. Frontal neocortex projects to all levels of the 
reticular formation.
wakefulness. REM is likely an intermediary step between SWS 
and wakefulness, a notion that is supported by unit recor-
dings of pedunculopontine neurons in various stages of the 
sleep–wakefulness cycle (Datta and Siwek, 2002). Aside from 
the obvious fact that REM is a more activated brain state than 
SWS, it is obviously a state that more closely resembles alert 
wakefulness During SWS, particularly the deepest Stage N3, 
large, slow field potentials arise from within cortical columns 
(Contreras and Steriade, 1995), reflecting a major disruption 
of cortical function. Awake consciousness and presumably 
REM occur with circuit reorganizations that not only anta-
gonize SWS but also according to numerous studies in recent 
years create multiple new higher frequencies.
Most recently, emphasis is being placed on high-frequency 
oscillations in cortex in the beta and gamma range as the index 
and probable cause of the enhanced thinking capabilities that 
occur concurrently with the fast waves (Uhlhaas et al., 2009). 
Unfortunately for theories of REM, spectral coherence studies 
have thus far mostly focused on the role of frequency-specific 
coherences during different wakefulness conditions, rather than 
on a rigorous comparison across the sleep cycle and its state tran-
sitions. The few field-potential coherence studies of sleep cycle 
do not yield a coherent understanding, but they clearly suggest 
an importance to consciousness for coherence of activity among 
neocortical regions.
High-frequency oscillation and inter-area coherences seem to be 
fundamental properties of both wakefulness and REM. Electrical 
stimulation of the caudal midbrain reticular formation can abolish 
large slow EEG waves and at the same time enhance and synchro-
nize high-frequency rhythms in intracortical and corticothalamic 
networks (Steriade et al., 1996). Within the REM state when dreams 
become lucid, frontal EEG exhibits more 40 Hz activity and at the 
same time frontal and posterior EEG activity become more coher-
ent (Voss et al., 2009).
Widespread gamma synchrony appears during wakefulness and 
REM, but not during SWS (Llinás and Ribrary, 1993). In both states 
there is a fronto-occipital phase shift of 12–13 ms. But such activity 
is not identical, in that sensory stimuli can re-set the oscillation in 
wakefulness but not in REM (or SWS). The activity in this study 
was filtered around 40 Hz, so it is possible that other frequencies, 
especially higher ones, are also synchronized during wakefulness 
and dreaming.
In another study (Cantero, et al., 2002), EEG coherence was 
strengthened between fronto-temporal cortical regions within a 
broad frequency range during SWS, but to the detriment of the 
coherence between temporal and parieto-occipital areas, suggest-
ing underlying compensatory mechanisms between temporal and 
other cortical regions. Coherence built up progressively across the 
night, although no changes were observed within a given SWS 
period. No electrophysiological changes were found within REM 
sleep epochs.
This lab reported another study (Cantero et al., 2003) in 
which there was no evidence of theta-band activity coherence in 
the hippocampus and the cerebral cortex in any brain state. But 
at sites within the hippocampus and cortex, theta activity was 
coherent during various stages of alert wakefulness and REM, 
but not SWS.
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Stimulus-induced awakening is not the same as a sleep situation 
where the brain arouses itself. In spontaneous awakening from 
sleep, the brain has to find a way to engage these arousal processes.
Those consciousness-generating processes are not trivial. Non-
human brains cannot do it at all or only minimally at best. Even 
with an adequate anatomical substrate, brains have to know how 
to generate the right network impulse patterns throughout vast 
regions of brain. They have to know what oscillatory frequencies 
to use and where, and how to synchronize them. After Stage N3, 
all this has to be done from a zero baseline. No wonder it takes all 
night of repeated REM for the brain to do this if it is unperturbed 
by external stimuli. The store of memories for how to activate the 
ARAS without external stimuli during REM may well be a key 
requirement to prod the ARAS to get back into the arousal loop.
Why do we resume a normal REM dream pattern after being 
awakened in the middle of the night? When one is awakened in 
the middle of the night, for whatever reason, the brain still needs 
more sleep, which is why a person goes back to sleep. The fact that 
REM and dreaming resume indicates the wake-up effect of REM 
has not yet been accomplished. Although dreaming is not needed to 
create the capacity for consciousness as such, the REM that causes 
dreaming may be needed to complete the used for optimal con-
scious function.
We should ask why the mammalian brain needs the deep stages 
of sleep. Two schools of thought prevail: (1) an evolutionary adap-
tation forces an organism to conserve energy and (2) restoration 
of physiological functions depleted during wakefulness (reviewed 
by Vertes, 1984). Why don’t lower animals need SWS? Except for a 
few reptiles and birds, they don’t exhibit SWS during their “sleep.” 
Presumably, SWS (and REM) are essential accompaniments of the 
brain development that enables consciousness.
There is some consolidation of memories going on in sleep 
(Rauchs, 2011; Wilhelm et al., 2011). Sleep provides a relative pro-
tection from external stimuli accessible in consciousness that could 
interfere with consolidation. Also, perhaps some regenerative “rest” 
occurs for neurotransmitter systems. Supporting the notion that 
SWS is a state of brain rest, neurons in virtually every brain area 
fire less during SWS than in any other state (Steridae and Hobson, 
1976). What Stage N3 accomplishes for brain doesn’t matter as far 
as answering the question of why we need REM. What does matter 
is recovering from N3.
Other reasonably supported reasons for SWS sleep include 
thermal regulation and psychological equilibrium (reviewed by 
Hobson, 2009).
WakE-up HypotHEsis prEdictivE and Explanatory 
poWEr
ontogEny/agE EffEcts
(1) Why does so much REM occur in the fetus (Roffwarg, et al., 
1966; Parmelee, et al., 1967), when few would contend that 
a fetus needs or is capable of consciousness?
Recordings from sheep fetuses reveal the presence of REM, and 
signs of REM are evident in human fetuses by 7 months of preg-
nancy (Schwab et al., 2009). REM occurs because the brain needs 
it. Fetuses and infants need heightened neural activity to stimulate 
brain development. About 50% of infant sleeping is spent in REM, 
compared to only about 20% for adults.
Electrophysiological approaches revealed ample excitatory 
cortico-fugal projections to the midbrain reticular formation 
from broad expanses of neocortex (Jasper et al., 1952; Bremer and 
Terzuolo, 1953; French, et al., 1955). In monkeys, neurons in the 
ARAS revealed short-latency activation by stimulation of the ocu-
lomotor frontal area, cingulate gyrus, orbital surface of the frontal 
lobe, sensorimotor neocortex, posterior parietal regions, and the 
superior temporal gyrus (French et al., 1955). The authors explicitly 
ventured the conclusion that the ARAS is regulated by cortico-
fugal inputs.
Corticifugal projections to the brainstem could influence the 
cortical activation of REM sleep via the thalamic reticular nucleus 
(TRN), a thin GABAergic layer of neurons that has bidirectional 
connections with the neocortex. Clear evidence of a TRN role dur-
ing various states of consciousness has been amply documented 
(Yingling and Skinner, 1977; Pinault, 2004). While a possible role 
in mediating cortical activation of the ARAS via REM has not 
been studied, a need for such studies is suggested by this “wake-
up” hypothesis and the fact that the cortico-fugal projections to 
TRN are strongly activating (Gentet and Ulrich, 2003; Evrard and 
Ropert, 2009; Lam and Sherman, 2010).
The ARAS exerts a powerful activating influence on the neocor-
tex via ascending projections via both reticular and intra-laminar 
regions of the thalamus (Nieuwenhuys et al., 2008). Thus, these 
areas of the thalamus and the cortico-fugal projections that they 
receive must be important in any consciousness recovery process 
involving the triggering of REM. Electrical stimulation evokes the 
characteristic signs of consciousness, namely, field-potential gamma 
waves in widespread areas of the neocortex (MacDonald et al., 1998).
The TRN is a nexus that mediates the interaction of topographi-
cally specific thalamic areas and the cortex in the processing of 
visual, auditory, and somatosensory inputs, movement, and limbic 
system operations (Guillery et al., 1998).The TRN is implicated in 
attentiveness, particularly for visual stimuli (Crick, 1984; Guillery, 
et al., 1998), which is not surprising given that the TRN has primary 
inputs from the lateral geniculate body as well as the brainstem. 
It receives inputs from the cortex and sends outputs back to the 
thalamus (Jones, 1975).
The intra-laminar portion of the thalamus contains neurons 
that have characteristic impulse firing patterns during wakeful-
ness (Steriade and Glenn, 1982). During transitions to wakefulness, 
intra-laminar thalamic neurons exhibit marked increases in firing, 
which lag the initial increase in brainstem and basal forebrain cho-
linergic neurons. Thus, it may be that while brainstem neurons trig-
ger consciousness, intra-laminar thalamic neurons may be needed 
to sustain it and regulate attention shifts (reviewed by Schiff, 2008).
fitting common ExpEriEncE into tHE nEW 
Explanation
How do we reconcile this wake-up view with the obvious fact that 
arousing stimuli during sleep, as with an alarm clock, can cause 
awakening without the need for preceding REM? First, if one is in 
Stage N3 sleep when the alarm goes off, arousal is hard to accom-
plish, because the depth of sleep in that stage is quite profound 
(reviewed by Dement and Mitler, 1974). Second, even when awak-
ened in Stage N3, most people are still groggy and not at their peak 
level of conscious function.
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(4) Wake-up hypothesis explains the claim that REM and drea-
ming are not necessarily related. Young children are said to 
have REM but do not dream” (Goodenough, 1978; Foulkes, 
1999). This conclusion was based on studies of 3- to 5-year-
olds. Very young children may not be good at remembering 
dreams. Even adults typically remember very few of their 
dreams. This is a skill that is best developed with specific 
effort and experience.
(5) Wake-up hypothesis predicts that less REM would occur in 
older adults who of course have had years learning how to 
“boot up” the brain. Even after learning any task, the task 
still has to be performed. It should get easier over time, of 
course, but we have no physiological metrics to indicate 
how hard or easy it is to awaken spontaneously. Also, the 
elderly have less SWS than younger people and therefore 
may have less need for REM (Prinz et al., 1982).
pHylogEny
(6) Why do all species sleep and awaken, even those that 
never show REM (Cirelli and Tononi, 2008)? We need to 
distinguish mammalian sleep from behavioral quiescence. 
Reports of EEG in lower animal species, like fish and 
amphibians, show what seems to be an “activated” EEG 
even during behavioral quiescence that superficially looks 
like sleep (Klemm, 1973). What is not clear is the frequency 
band of such “activated” EEGs. Such data were obtained 
before the age of digital EEG and frequency analysis. We 
know little about the full frequency band and spatio-tem-
poral coherences in the EEG of any non-primate species. 
Moreover, the degree and topography of coherences have 
never been subjected to examination in any lower spe-
cies. One index of degree of consciousness could well be 
the ratio of gamma activity to beta activity. Another index 
could be frequency-band-specific differences in the level 
and topographic distribution of coherence within and 
between frequencies.
The important point as it relates to mammalian sleep is that 
fish, amphibians, and many reptiles do not have the capacity for 
generating large, slow EEG waves during behavioral quiescence 
(i.e., SWS) with interspersed epochs of REM. Mammalian sleep 
is presumably an evolved capacity, as is consciousness, and likely 
is a physiologically demanding state that requires long periods of 
brain “rest.”
(7) The wake-up hypothesis predicts that REM would only 
occur in advanced species (more recently evolved repti-
les and mammals and in humans). The previous answer 
applies here as well. But to expand the explanation only 
these species have the capacity (and apparently need) for 
SWS.
I should add that primitive species lack the neocortex piece of 
the ARAS neural machinery to produce consciousness in the first 
place. Moreover, EEGs suggest that the brains of these animals don’t 
have the mechanisms for the Stage N3 kind of sleep either. Stage N3 
may be a needed recovery process in species that can generate full 
consciousness, and REM and dreaming could be needed recovery 
processes for Stage N3.
In addition to needing REM for brain development, I suggest 
that moving up out of the Stage N3 pit is hard for young, immature 
brains, because they are still learning how to optimize conscious-
ness-generating processes.
How can one know whether a fetus has consciousness, especially 
late in gestation? In any case, fetal brain probably benefits from the 
stimulus of REM in promoting maturation. A great deal of REM 
may be needed to help fetal brain acquire the capacity for achieving 
consciousness after birth.
(2) Wake-up hypothesis predicts a learning component to a 
brain’s ability to generate and sustain consciousness. Is it not 
possible that a developing brain has to learn how to arouse 
itself from sleep or at least perfect endogenous mechanisms? 
Think about babies. They sleep most the time and typically 
have only short periods of wakefulness necessitated no doubt 
by the need for feeding (or the discomfort of soiled diapers). 
Their sleep is frequently punctuated by short episodes of 
REM (body twitches, EEG activation, and even smiling; Petre-
Quadens, 1974). Adults have less REM as they get older. These 
age relationships exist in all species that have SWS and REM 
capability. Is it possible that REM is a process for helping to 
train the brain how to generate consciousness from a sleeping 
state? After all, because of physical limitations, a baby has very 
limited opportunity to hone its consciousness-generating 
skills through conscious interaction in the outside world. The 
inner-world conscious engagement provided by REM and 
dreaming may be nature’s way for the brain to master one of 
its most important capabilities, trigger consciousness in the 
absence of external stimulation. Perhaps older brains need less 
REM because they have learned efficient ways to awaken.
There is also the matter that the brain is still developing in the very 
young. REM provides longer periods of neocortical stimulation to 
help promote neuronal growth and synapse formation. Further, REM 
may be helping the infant brain learn how to generate consciousness.
(3) The wake-up hypothesis predicts that SWS and REM would 
be ontologically linked (Roffwarg et al., 1966; de Benedictis 
et al., 2007). Babies may need more REM sleep to help con-
struct the capability for consciousness. Also, REM provides 
stimulation to an undeveloped brain.
Seminal studies of infants have been reported by Kahn 
(pp. 204–205, in Weitzman, 1972). He electrographically monitored 
2-year-olds who slept at night and napped in the daytime and 5-year-
olds who slept only at night. Both groups showed the first non-REM 
period (dominated by Stage N3) was the longest sleep stage of the 
night. The successive duration of Stage N3 sleep in 2-year-olds was 
39, 13, 11, 8, 5, 2, 1 min. In 5-year-olds, it was 75, 15, 8, 5, 0, 1 min. 
REM periods had about the same duration (∼20–25 min) through-
out the night. Both groups revealed that children awakened within 
the last REM episode. Likewise, napping in the 2-year-olds was ter-
minated in REM. It is almost as if SWS and REM were competing 
processes and as a night’s sleep progresses, REM starts to win.
Rapid eye movement occurs because the baby’s brain needs it. 
Infants and fetuses need heightened neural activity to stimulate 
brain development. Moving up out of the Stage N3 pit is hard for 
young, immature brains, because they are still learning what the 
consciousness-generating process is all about.
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to lift brain function out of the Stage N3 pit. It may also be 
true, but has never been tested to my knowledge, that Stage 
N3 is deeper and more profound in humans than in lower 
mammals.
abnormal/disEasE conditions
(12) How does the wake-up hypothesis fit changes in REM inci-
dence in various psychiatric diseases? It is not surprising 
that cognitive disorders would affect (and may be affected 
by) REM. In clinical depression, for example, REM sleep 
incidence increases (Coble et al., 1981). This might be a 
response to the need of the brain to antagonize the depres-
sion; that is, the brain may find it more difficult to arouse a 
depressed brain.
(13) Since anti-depressants decrease REM, they should also 
decrease SWS so there is less need for REM. to regenerate 
consciousness. These drugs decrease Stage N3 sleep and 
increase the lighter Stages I and II sleep (Cohen et al., 1982). 
Thus, there is less need for REM and less difficulty for REM 
helping brain to regenerate consciousness. The depression 
of REM only occurs for the first few nights, then it rebounds 
to become prolific (Lewis and Oswald, 1969). Also, it seems 
inappropriate to use an abnormal state to explain what hap-
pens in normal sleep. In this case, the drug itself may have 
stimulus properties that facilitate spontaneous awakening. 
Note also that these drugs take several days to start showing 
their effect.
(14) The wake-up hypothesis posits that REM contributes to 
achieving consciousness, but does not necessarily affect the 
quality of that state. For example, drug-free schizophrenics 
have sleep and dream patterns similar to normals (Lauer 
et al., 1997). Therefore, the role of REM seems confined to 
generating consciousness per se without necessarily deter-
mining the quality of that consciousness.
(15) How can one explain why people can awaken from anes-
thesia without preceding REM? First, anesthesia is not nor-
mal sleep. It may be too much to expect any hypothesis of 
normal function to explain all abnormal function. Second, 
the impression that consciousness just pops up from anes-
thetization may be an illusion. The anesthetized brain must 
struggle mightily to overcome the drug’s depression of net-
work activity needed for consciousness. We know that strug-
gle goes on because it gets expressed in physical thrashing 
about. That is why orderlies strap surgical patients to a 
gurney and “hide” them in a recovery room while the brain 
is fighting the body to wake-up. Do we know that REM is 
absent during such times? One study showed that 44% of 
patients actually dreamed during surgical anesthesia and 
two-thirds of these could recall the dream content (Brice 
et al., 1970).
Also, there is also a lot of poking and prodding stimulation 
during recovery from vital-sign checking, clean-up, bandaging, etc. 
As for absence of dream recollection, dreams, and hallucinations 
may well be occurring during recovery from anesthesia but can’t 
be remembered because the drug prevents consolidation of the 
dream memories.
The neocortex is the seat of consciousness, and the primitive 
cortex of lower animals (reviewed by Mountcastle, 1998) is not 
likely to generate the full-blown consciousness of humans. There 
is thus less need for SWS, and likewise less need for REM.
In a few reptile species, birds, and lower mammals, REM epochs 
can occur, but they are short and don’t occur often during a night’s 
sleep. But the fact that these species have REM at all suggests that 
they have some degree of consciousness during REM and their 
wakefulness. They may be marginally sentient beings. This has to 
be seriously considered in higher mammals such as domesticated 
animals and non-human primates. Anyone who has had close 
relationships with animals such as dogs, cats, or horses already 
appreciates this possibility.
Prey species, such as ruminants, rabbits, and guinea pigs, sleep 
very little and likewise have little REM (reviewed in Campbell and 
Tobler, 1984). Long bouts of SWS and REM increase the vulner-
ability time for predation, and thus prey species cannot afford to 
sleep much. This is what you might expect if REM is needed to 
antagonize SWS. With less SWS, there is less need for REM.
Capacity for SWS and REM appeared early in mammalian evolu-
tion. For example, modern armadillos, anatomically little changed 
from their 65-million-year-old Xenarthran ancestors, show electro-
graphic REM signs approximately 8.9–21.5% of their behaviorally 
quiescent sleep time, depending on criteria and data interpretation 
(Prudom and Klemm, 1972). The typical slow-wave EEG pattern 
occurred about 50% of the total sleep time, with durations of a 
given period ranging from 0.75 to 375 min. Sleep in armadillos is 
fragmented because their poor thermoregulatory capability leads 
to the disruptive effects of shivering.
(8) How does one explain the sleep without REM that occurs in 
the “Immobility Reflex” (also known as Tonic Immobility 
or Animal Hypnosis)? Again, one should not confuse quie-
scence with sleep. Immediately after induction into this 
state, which is normally produced by physical restraint 
and manipulation, the EEG is activated and muscle tone is 
sustained. Soon afterward, the EEG may show large slow-
waves, but the state is spontaneously terminated then or 
even earlier (Klemm, 1990b).
(9) The wake-up hypothesis explains the atypical REM sleep of 
ruminants. Originally, scientists assumed that ruminants 
never slept, just dozed, in order to keep from regurgitating 
their regurgitated cud. However, we now know that rumi-
nants do exhibit SWS and REM, and they shut down rumi-
nation to do so (Klemm, 1966). Total time is SWS is short, 
so not surprisingly, REM is short.
(10) How do we explain lack of sleep and REM in marine mam-
mals? They can’t sleep or they would drown. Actually, they 
do sleep, but only one hemisphere at a time (Mukhametov, 
1984, 1987). While clear signs of REM have not been repor-
ted in sleeping whales, dolphins, or fur seals (Lyamin et al., 
2004), an explanation may be that their brains never totally 
shut down during sleep. One hemisphere is always wide 
awake.
(11) Wake-up hypothesis predicts that the most developed REM 
capability should occur in humans. A species that has the 
highest level of consciousness has farther for the brain to go 
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(23) The wake-up hypothesis helps to explain why the brain 
needs to make up lost REM. Both animal and human expe-
riments confirm that the brain needs REM and, if REM-
deprived, will devote extra time to REM. Though sleep may 
be cut short by external arousal stimuli, the next time the 
brain goes to sleep, it is lacking the complete “rehearsal” 
needed to awaken itself. REM effects are apparently cumu-
lative. The brain intuitively “knows” that REM is an impor-
tant tool it must nurture. It has learned how important 
REM is.
(24) How do people wake-up on their own after a night of 
being deprived of REM by a sleep-research experimenter? 
Of course, the only way such experimental subjects can be 
deprived of REM is for the experimenter to jostle them into 
wakefulness every time the REM physiological signs first 
appear. All that external stimulation must have a cumula-
tive arousal effect that is likely to be much greater than any 
alarm clock.
In rats, a common way of preventing REM is to make rats sleep 
on a flower pot inverted in a tub of water. When they fall into REM, 
the postural atonia causes them to fall into the water. Isn’t that a 
strong external stimulus? In other words, the way awakening occurs 
in REM-deprived subjects is through strong external stimulation.
(25) How does this idea apply to lucid dreams? A lucid dream 
is a dream in which one is aware that one is dreaming. I do 
not know of any studies that have tracked whether or not a 
dream was more likely to be lucid at a given point in sleep. 
Perhaps the quasi-conscious participation of self in lucid 
dreams is moving the brain closer to awakening threshold. 
It would be useful to query people as they wake-up and tally 
the percentage of the immediately antecedent dreams that 
were lucid.
(26) Why do we awaken at the end of REM? In a study of young 
adults (Feinberg, et al., 1967), awakening always occurred 
within a REM episode. Vertes (1990) surmised that the role 
of REM is to counteract SWS (p. 565). What form might 
such counteraction take? How would REM activate the 
ARAS? Earlier, I suggested that excitatory cortico-fugal 
projections to the ARAS could do the job.
Consciousness disappears during SWS, and there is minimal 
excitation coming from the outside world. As a result the ARAS 
receives little-to-no excitation from the periphery or from feed-
back from the neocortex. Neocortex and ARAS presumably have 
a reciprocal relationship. ARAS triggers neocortical activation and 
an activated neocortex supplies feedback to help keep the ARAS 
active. But in sleep, neocortex neurons that supply input to the 
ARAS slow their impulse firing drastically, thus removing excita-
tory drive to the ARAS. If a sleeping brain is to become conscious 
without external stimuli, it must have a self-generating mechanism, 
and that mechanism probably requires the neocortex to activate the 
ARAS, perhaps by releasing it from inhibition. Reticular neurons in 
the midbrain may be critical in this activation, because they receive 
converging excitatory input not only from reticular neurons in the 
medulla and collaterals from sensory fibers, but also from cerebral 
neocortex, the preoptic “sleep center” area, and several nuclei in 
the thalamus.
cognition
(16) The wake-up hypothesis predicts that REM would promote 
dreaming, because dreaming is an imperfect simulation of the 
awake state. Eventually, REM should be expected to drive the 
brain to wakefulness threshold, which is consistent with the 
common observation that people often awake while dreaming.
(17) The wake-up hypothesis also predicts that because everyone 
has SWS, everyone should have REM and dreams, even 
those who say they don’t dream in normal sleeping. When 
sleepers are awakened and queried during physiological 
signs of REM, they often reveal that they had been dreaming 
at the time of awakening, Under normal sleep conditions, 
people don’t remember all their dreams. Skill at remembe-
ring dreams can be developed through training.
(18) Because REM is an abortive attempt to wake-up, wake-up 
hypothesis predicts that the dreaming of REM and con-
scious wakefulness are cognitively and neurophysiologically 
similar. Both states are egoistic and a “sense of I” is operative. 
Dreaming is a simulation of the conscious life of wakeful-
ness. Dreams can be bizarre, because there is no constraint 
of external stimuli and reality and perhaps because comple-
tely normal neural activity is not yet established. As men-
tioned, both states are dependent on brainstem reticular 
formation activity. The EEGs are similar in the two states 
(Dement, 1958), as are the fundamental excitatory and inhi-
bitory thalamocortical processes (Steriade et al., 1979).
(19) The wake-up hypothesis predicts that REM episodes would 
be short and choppy, at least early in a night’s sleep. Why 
doesn’t the brain try to recover from Stage N3 with just one 
long REM episode instead of having a series of choppy short 
bouts of REM? If a long, sustained REM episode in early 
evening could cause awakening, a person might not get 
enough SWS. For whatever reason, a short sleep cycle is not 
acceptable to human brain. The repeated episodes of short 
REM probably reflect the difficulty the brain has to fight its 
way out of stupor.
(20) How can we explain why cognitive activity (“dreaming”) 
can occur in non-REM sleep, and it does not cause awa-
kening (Hobson et al., 2000)? First, by definition, NREM 
dreaming is clearly not moving the brain to awakening to 
the same extent REM does. Also, non-REM dreaming appa-
rently only occurs to a limited extent in light sleep stages 
(Foulkes, 1962; Nielsen, 2000). Wake-up hypothesis posits 
that it is not dreaming per se that wakes people up, but the 
intrinsic triggering of the ARAS.
bEHavioral pHysiology
(21) The wake-up hypothesis predicts that REM would only 
appear in lighter stages of sleep (see Figure 1). If REM is 
triggered by cortico-fugal projections to the ARAS, then 
these could be too suppressed in deep Stage N3 sleep to 
trigger REM.
(22) The wake-up hypothesis predicts that REM should increase 
toward morning. As the night and REM episodes progress, 
the brain is gaining capacity to awaken itself. Each succes-
sive REM epoch should make it easier to move into REM 
and eventual self-induced awakening.
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aspect. How could that be a trivial and random process? Some 
dream content, for example, is highly structured, not likely to be 
created and sustained by random action-potential firing. Such an 
explanation could not apply to the consciousness of wakefulness, 
and it seems unlikely to be applicable to the consciousness of 
dreaming. If consciousness were that easy to generate, why don’t 
more species show it?… and why do we need a whole night’s 
sleep to achieve it?
We should be skeptical of cavalier claims the neuron firing pat-
terns during dreaming are random. Have rigorous tests of random-
ness have been made?
In REM, almost all neurons in all parts of the brain increase 
firing rate during REM, compared with SWS and often compared 
with alert wakefulness (Evarts, 1967; Hobson and McCarley, 1971). 
Since firing rate is generally considered indicative of biologically 
significant information processing, to regard it as noise and random 
seems unjustified. Paradoxically, it was Hobson and McCarley who 
helped prove that impulse discharge increases in REM.
Other lines of evidence argue against REM resulting from ran-
dom activity. Certain neurons in the pons, the seat of REM genesis, 
fire in clusters to create so-called PGO waves during REM (Sakai, 
1980). Likewise, neurons controlling the REMs of REM fire selec-
tively during REM and not SWS. The same can be said for brainstem 
neurons that cause the postural atonia of REM.
Some neurons fire less during REM. For instance, locus coeruleus 
cells not only fire at higher rates during SWS, but are virtually 
silent during REM (Foote et al., 1980; Aston-Jones and Bloom, 
1981). Raphe nuclei discharge at progressively lower rates from 
wakefulness to SWS to REM (Jacobs et al., 1974; Jacobs and Jones, 
1978). Septal neurons fire in discontinuous “theta-rhythm” bursts 
throughout REM, but not SWS. All these regional disparities are 
inconsistent with the idea that REM comes from random unit 
activity.
The sleeping brain may be using REM to re-construct the highly 
ordered combinatorial coding and temporal coherences of neocor-
tical circuitry needed to facilitate awakening into full consciousness 
competency. This re-organization may even include adjusting the 
sleep–wakefulness servo-system’s set-point circuit to make con-
sciousness easier to generate and sustain, being fortified against 
drowsing off to sleep during boring parts of the day.
One problem common to each of these theories is the presuppo-
sition of purpose. REM and dreaming surely have neurophysiologi-
cal effects, but assigning purpose may not be appropriate. What if 
REM is a consequence of something else and its correlates such 
as emotional venting and memory consolidation are coincidental 
by-products of intrinsic REM processes?
What might that “something else” be? I suggest it is the cumu-
lative effect of satisfying the need for SWS. Wakefulness, as the 
biologically most adaptive state, may be the brain’s default mode. 
Once the need for SWS is satisfied the brain needs to wake-up.
A more recent hypothesis has been proposed by Hobson 
(2009). He suggests that REM is a “protoconscious state… that 
is of functional use to the development and maintenance of wak-
ing consciousness.” No way to test the idea is proposed. The pre-
sent wake-up hypothesis specifies what this “functional use” may 
be. Additionally, the wake-up hypothesis is testable, and several 
approaches are herein suggested.
The sleeping brain’s arousal problem is made more difficult 
when consciousness has to be dredged up out of the deepest stage 
of sleep.
comparison WitH compEting tHEoriEs
Competing theories focus on either REM or the dreaming that 
occurs in REM. One REM hypothesis, currently in great vogue, 
is that the activated neuronal activity has the purpose of help-
ing consolidate memories of the day’s experiences, especially for 
procedural memories (Stickgold et al., 2000a,b; Wilson and Louie, 
2001; Maquet et al., 2002). Experimental disruption of dreams does 
interfere with long-term memory formation. The problem is that 
such off-line processing and memory consolidation also occur in 
non-REM sleep.
The consolidation hypothesis could have it backward. Maybe 
we don’t have REM to consolidate the day’s memories but that 
consolidation is a consequence of the brain continuing to oper-
ate in sleep, and, in the absence of external stimulation, resumes 
processing of the day’s experiences because that is the information 
most readily at hand.
Rapid eye movement may occur as a way to mobilize the 
brain for the next day’s activity, constituting a “dress rehearsal” 
for the next day. These factors were an integral part of the idea 
that the brainstem enables an ARAS-mediated behavioral “readi-
ness response” to stimuli to assure that appropriate behavior 
and cognition occur (Klemm, 1990). REM could help the brain 
rehearse how to reactivate readiness when the time comes in the 
morning. A related explanation for young, immature brains is 
that REM provides a source of endogenous stimulation that is 
useful in promoting brain maturation and the capability for 
consciousness.
This way of looking at the issue is the perspective of an animal 
physiologist. A similar explanation for REM was also proposed by 
the physiologist, Vertes (1984, 1986). He suggested that REM sleep 
provided endogenous stimulation to prevent the brain from being 
shut down too long in SWS and that such sustained suppression 
might make it difficult to awaken. I agree.
Psychologists like to focus on dreams, as opposed to the REM 
that enables dreaming. Ancient shaman priests and religious proph-
ets have thought of dreams as God’s way of communicating with 
us (of course these folks did not know about REM or that other 
mammals also have REM that might support dreaming. If they had, 
they might have concluded that God talks to animals too). Then 
came Freud and psychiatrists, who focused on the dreams of REM 
(REM had not been discovered in Freud’s time). They thought of 
dreaming as the brain’s release of subconscious thinking into dream 
consciousness. Among the early ideas that have been mentioned 
is the possibility that dreaming acts as an escape valve for letting 
off the “psychic steam” that accumulates from emotional stresses 
during the day. Dream content does have symbolic meaning, as 
Freud showed. People become anxious, irritable, and sometimes 
borderline psychotic, if they are experimentally deprived of REM 
and its dreaming.
Yet another hypothesis is that REM is said to be caused by 
random impulse activity, and as a result the brain dreams and 
makes up stories to try and make sense of all the erratic activity 
Hobson and McCarley (1977). But dreams have a major conscious 
Klemm A wake-up hypothesis
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 73 | 9
 vertebrate glia. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 
13, 441–474.
Braun, A. R., Balkin, T. J., Wesenten, N. J., 
Carson, R. E., Varga, M., Baldwin, P., 
in the sleep-waking cycle. J. Neurosci. 
1, 876–886.
Barres, G. A., Chun, L. L. Y., and 
Corey, D. P. (1990). Ion channels in 
Aston-Jones, G., and Bloom, R. E. (1981). 
Activity of the norepinephrine-
containing locus ceruleus neurons in 
behaving rats anticipate fluctuations 
rEfErEncEs
Alvarez-Maubecin, V. (2000). Functional 
coupling between neurons and glia. J. 
Neurosci. 20, 4091–4098.
awakening comes from our subjective experience that awakening 
from sleep (or even anesthesia) seems to be “switched on.” Just 
what happens when this “switch” is thrown may only seem to be 
instantaneous, but in any case a distinct transition occurs that has 
to be caused by specific changes in the network dynamics of the 
relevant brain areas.
Of course REM sleep has functions other than the wake-up 
hypothesis and these need not be mutually exclusive. The point 
advocated here is that a major function of REM is to help a sleep-
ing brain wake-up.
conclusion
Rapid eye movement sleep has several benefits in addition to “re-
booting” a sleeping brain. Just getting ready for the next day’s con-
scious activity has its value, even if there were no need to overcome 
the neural disruption of Stage N3 sleep. There is also a potential 
benefit in consolidating certain memories that perhaps cannot be 
accomplished as well in other stages of sleep.
Then there is the likelihood that REM and dream content can 
have reward properties. Dog owners, for example, may be justified 
in the suspicion that their dog sleeps so much because it is bored 
and looks forward to the adventures, such as chasing deer and 
catching critters that it has learned can be experienced without 
effort in REM and its dreams. Dreams are nature’s way of enhanc-
ing the life experience.
This also relates to a basic propensity of brain: stimulus seeking. 
Advanced animals have an evolved brain that feeds on stimulus. 
REM is a very convenient way to address that need.
Rapid eye movement sleep’s cortical stimulus role is at the heart 
of the wake-up hypothesis. Since Stage N3 sleep cortical-column 
dynamics drive the brain out of the mode required for conscious-
ness, the column circuits have to be re-set, and that apparently can 
only be accomplished via the ARAS, which in stimulus-absent sleep 
must be switched on by a much less efficient processes generated 
within corticothalamic and corticobulbar systems. REM episodes 
may be difficult to sustain in early evening because corticifugal 
influences are apparently less robust than external stimulation. As 
the night’s sleep progresses, the brain becomes more facile at trig-
gering and sustaining REM to the set-point threshold for awaken-
ing. The existence of such supposed changes could be tested with 
the appropriate electrophysiological approaches.
The wake-up view supports the obvious impression that there 
is some sort of antagonism between SWS and REM. The dreaming 
that occurs during human REM could be considered incidental to 
a REM process that is auto-triggered by SWS. REM could serve to 
help consciousness-generating systems to reach threshold in the 
absence of external stimulation. In short, whatever triggers REM 
may do so via the ARAS, which otherwise remains dormant without 
external stimulation.
Of all REM theories, the wake-up hypothesis comes closest to 
explaining all the key characteristics of REM.
tEsting rEm tHEoriEs
To be accepted, any hypothesis should be testable. Since the wake-
up hypothesis is that REM moves the brain closer to awakening 
threshold, the obvious approach is to compare awakening thresh-
old in SWS with that in REM. However, in a dream during REM, 
disruption might be difficult because of focused attention on 
dream content. Therefore, one might need to compare awaken-
ing threshold in SWS with that during REM when human subjects 
report existence of a dream and REM when subjects were not 
aware of a dream.
Wake-up hypothesis is testable if one builds upon the so-called 
“reciprocal interaction model” described by Steriade and McCarley 
(2005; pp. 513–560). This model posits a REM oscillator circuit 
intrinsic to certain regions of the brainstem that ultimately control 
neocortical activity. A necessary first step would seem to examine 
the network dynamics of ARAS, pontine REM circuits, thalamus, 
and neocortex. Unit activity in the ARAS is the most conspicuous 
sign so far identified for transition from SWS to REM or wakeful-
ness (Steriade et al., 1982). But past research has usually involved 
recording from one or a few neurons in a given area at a time. 
Testing the wake-up hypothesis requires simultaneous recording 
in the several relevant brain areas and comparing the activity in 
wakefulness, SWS, and REM.
Ideally, such studies should use combinatorial mathematics to 
evaluate unit activity coding among simultaneously recorded neu-
rons within defined circuits (Klemm, 2011). This approach has yet 
to be applied in neuroscience in general, and the sleep cycle would 
be an excellent place to start.
If REM occurs because of interactions with neocortex, then sleep 
cycle studies are needed in which the ARAS circuitry is evaluated, 
particularly the cortico-reticular projections (Leichnetz et al., 
1987). Recordings from intra-laminar and reticular thalamus are 
also needed. Such studies should also include field-potential obser-
vations, because significant state-dependent frequency coherence 
patterns are likely, as existing literature indicates. Field-potential 
studies would probably benefit from use wavelet analysis, which 
is less affected by the non-stationarity of sleep cycle state changes 
than power spectral approaches.
Finally, a possibility usually completely ignored is the role of 
ultra-slow activity and associated molecular events, much of which 
is probably generated by glia cells (Barres et al., 1990; Fields and 
Stevens-Graham, 2002). These potentials could create a background 
that profoundly alters thresholds for transitioning among various 
sleep stages, REM, and awake consciousness. Technical difficulties 
abound in the study of glia, but it seems clear that glial cells are 
functionally coupled to neurons, both electrotonically (Alvarez-
Maubecin, 2000) and electrochemically.
This wake-up hypothesis invites re-examination of the role of 
the ARAS in awake consciousness. First, it could help confirm and 
identify the set-point threshold for consciousness that the ARAS 
has to reach to trigger consciousness. The idea of threshold for 
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